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Agentic Attack Tooling Research Series: A Guide to All Fourteen Parts

When attack tooling becomes AI-agent-driven, both sides of the conflict change. This is a fourteen-part deep research series: starting from a publicly attributed real-world incident, it unpacks architecture design, coordination mechanisms, and technical principles, then returns to a checklist defenders can use immediately plus isolated research practice.

2026/10/11 · AI Agent · Security · Series Guide
Evidence

When AI Learns to Pentest: The ARTEX Case and the Rise of Agentic Attack Tooling

In October 2026, an open-source AI pentesting tool called ARTEX was linked to attacks on South Korean financial institutions — and within 48 hours its developer pulled the source and went closed-source. This article reconstructs the timeline, unpacks its technical positioning, and answers the more important question: how should defenders respond when attack tooling is driven by AI agents?

2026/10/11 · AI Agent · Security · Attack Surface
Evidence

Credentials and AD Concepts: The Most Critical Link in the Attack Chain, Explained Plainly

Why do attackers fixate on the step of "obtaining the administrator password"? Kerberos, hashes, pass-the-hash, lateral movement — these terms appear constantly in security reports yet are rarely explained. This article unpacks the conceptual layer with everyday analogies, and why credential isolation is the highest-return defensive investment.

2026/10/11 · Credential Security · Active Directory · Authentication
Evidence

Defense Lessons from a Red-Team Postmortem: Six Failure Causes, Six Defensive Openings

A rare public red-team postmortem honestly lists six root causes from an autonomous penetration exercise. This article reads each root cause in reverse as an opportunity defenders can exploit, and distils them into a checklist for enterprise risk review.

2026/10/11 · Red Team · Defense Strategy · Incident Response
Evidence

The Economics of Ransomware: Why It Persists and How to Make It Unprofitable

Ransomware is not a technical problem; it is a business. Understanding its cost structure, revenue model, and risk pricing is what allows effective defence. This article analyses the business through an economic lens and explains three levers for making attacks unprofitable.

2026/10/11 · Ransomware · Risk Management · Business Continuity
Evidence

Zero Trust Architecture: Not a Product Purchase but a Change of Assumption

In vendor decks, "zero trust" often becomes a product name; fundamentally it is only a change of assumption — no longer assuming the inside is safe. This article unpacks three core principles, four implementation layers, five common misconceptions, and why it is the same work as credential governance and insider threat management.

2026/10/11 · Zero Trust · Architecture · Authentication